

# Regional Analysis of Youth Demographics

## EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES

### Key messages<sup>1</sup>

- By 2065, the population of four East African Community countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda) will be 468 million, a 206% increase from the current levels. Uganda's population will rise from 40.1 to 141.2 million; Kenya, from 47.2 to 115 million; Tanzania from 53.9 to 186.9 million; and Rwanda from 11.6 to 25.3 million. Of this increase, youth aged 15-34 years in the four countries will increase from 62 million to 153.4 million.
- The school-age population at primary and secondary school will increase significantly. The cost of providing basic education will more than double in Tanzania and Uganda between 2015 and 2065.
- The population increase will put pressure on natural resources and other basic services such as health care, housing and economic infrastructure. The risk of doing nothing will result to further environmental degradation, increased risk of civil conflicts as resources become scarce, food insecurity, high poverty levels, and increased migration.
- The EAC region can use the opportunity now to turn its youthful population into a benefit. This requires investments to accelerate fertility decline, improve human capital of its youth and generate decent jobs to improve living standards.

### Context

Approximately 17% of the world's 7.5 billion people live in Africa, and by 2065, the continent's population will comprise 28% of the world's population. Roughly 60% of the African population is less than 25 years-old (compared with 41% globally), and on average, an African woman expects to have at least four children during her lifetime, compared to less than three children for the rest of the world.<sup>2</sup> High fertility and falling child mortality rates have led to high annual population growth rates in Africa (on average 2.5% compared to 1.1% for the world).

The East African Community (EAC), is a regional intergovernmental partnership between six countries (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania), originally conceived in 1967 by three founder states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), and formally established in 2000 by a treaty. The pillars of integration, which are at various stages of implementation, include customs union, common market, monetary union, and ultimately political federation. The four EAC countries (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda),

which are the focus of this briefing note, have a combined population of more than 150 million, with Rwanda being the smallest in terms of population size (see Table 1). Like the rest of Africa, the EAC is experiencing demographic changes which are affecting not just the size, but also the age-structure and the region's social and economic progress.

Africa's large youthful population has been identified as a significant challenge for development since states (and households) bear the heavy burden

Table 1: Demographic profiles of EAC Countries

Country	Total population in millions (2015) <sup>a</sup>	Youth, 15-24 years as a % of total population (2015)	Children, 0-14 years as a % of total population (2015)	Total fertility rate <sup>c</sup>		Percentage of married women (15-49 years) using modern contraceptives <sup>c</sup>		Under-five mortality-deaths per 1000 live births <sup>c</sup>	
				Early 1990s	2014-16	Early 1990s	2014-16	Early 1990s	2014-16
Kenya	44.2	20%	42%	6.7	3.9	27	53	90	52
Rwanda	11.3	20%	40%	6.2	4.2	13	48	151	50
Tanzania	53.9	19%	45%	6.2	5.2	7	32	141	67
Uganda	35.5	21%	47%	7.4	5.4	3	35	177	64
Africa	1256 <sup>b</sup>	19%	41%	5.7	4.4	10	33	167	75

Sources: (a) National Population and Housing Census projection Reports (Kenya, 2012), Rwanda (2014), Tanzania (2015), Uganda (2016); (b) United Nations, 2017 Revision, World Population Prospects; (c) Demographic and Health Surveys/ Multiple Indicator Surveys.

<sup>1</sup>Disclaimer: This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) through the Research for Evidence Division (RED) for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained in it are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance placed on them.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data acquired via website

of providing for basic services and needs of children and youth, thereby limiting their ability to accumulate savings which could be invested for higher productivity and infrastructure development.<sup>3,4</sup> Between the early 1990s and 2014-16, the EAC countries experienced fertility declines ranging from 45% (Kenya) to 13% (Tanzania) with current fertility rate being between 3.9 for Kenya to 5.4 for Uganda. The age-specific fertility patterns for the four countries show that Rwandese youth (15-24 years) have much lower fertility compared to the other three countries, but older Rwandese women have much higher fertility than their

Kenyan counterparts, so that the total fertility for Rwanda is higher than Kenya's (see Figure 1). Child marriages contribute significantly to the high adolescent childbearing in the EAC. The most recent Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in the four countries show that among females age 20-24, 34% in Uganda,<sup>5</sup> 31% in Tanzania,<sup>6</sup> 23% in Kenya<sup>7</sup> and 7% in Rwanda<sup>8</sup> were married by their 18th birthday. High levels of adolescent childbearing are also associated with low socio-economic status, low levels of education, poor access to sexuality information and contraceptive services, and harmful cultural practices and norms.<sup>9,10</sup>

As Figure 2 shows, youth, especially the unmarried, have high unmet need for contraception (women with unmet need are those who want to stop or delay childbearing but are not using any method of contraception). Even though all the four countries and EAC have policies that acknowledge this to be a problem, actual provision of contraception among unmarried youth is highly sensitive because of cultural and religious objections.

With respect to childhood mortality, all four countries have experienced declines in under-





Figure 2: Unmet need for contraception among sexually active 15-24-year old women by marital status, DHS 2014-16



<sup>3</sup> Canning D., Raja S., Yazbeck A. S. (2015). Africa's demographic transition: dividend or disaster? African Development Forum, Washington DC: The World Bank.

<sup>4</sup> UNFPA and AFIDEP. (2015). Synthesis Report on the Demographic Dividend in Africa. UNFPA East and Southern Africa Regional Office, Johannesburg, South Africa.

<sup>5</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and ICF. (2017). Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2016: Key Indicators Report. Kampala, Uganda: UBOS, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: UBOS and ICF

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Health (MoH) [Zanzibar], National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Office of the Chief Government Statistician (OCGS), and ICF. (2016). Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey (TDHS-MIS) 2015-

<sup>7</sup> Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Health/Kenya, National AIDS Control Council/Kenya, Kenya Medical Research Institute, National Council for Population and Development/Kenya, and ICF International. (2015). Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2014

<sup>8</sup> National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Ministry of Health, & ICF International. (2015). Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2014-15. Rockville, Maryland, USA: NISR, MOH, and ICF International.

<sup>9</sup> Neal, S., Ruktanonchai, C., Chandra-Mouli, V., Matthews, Z., Tatem, A.J. (2016). Mapping adolescent first births within three east African countries using data from Demographic and Health Surveys: exploring geospatial methods to inform policy. *Reproductive Health*, 13:98.

<sup>10</sup> World Health Organization (2014). Adolescent Pregnancy factsheet. <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs364/en/>. Accessed August 2017.

five mortality, but the rate of progress varies. Data from national DHS conducted between the early 1990s and 2014 -16 show that Rwanda made the most progress, with a 67% decline in under-five mortality while Kenya made the least progress with a 42% decline but had a lower baseline child mortality.

## Youth Demographics in the EAC and Prospects for a Demographic Dividend

While the United Nations (UN) defines the youth as young men and women in the age category of 15 to 24, there are alternate definitions for the age-group in the EAC. The EAC Youth Policy defines youth as those between 15 and 35 years, which is currently the most generous age-range for the region. In Rwanda, the definition of youth changed in 2015 from 14 - 35 years to 16-30 years; in Tanzania youth are those aged between 15 and 35 years according to the National Youth Development Policy updated in 2007; in Kenya, a youth is defined as one aged between 18-34 years (revised in the 2010 National Constitution), while in Uganda youth are people aged 15 to 30 years as per the 2016 Uganda National Youth Policy.

Prospects for economic transformation in Africa have in recent years been buoyed by analyses identifying the conditions under which countries in the continent can harness the **demographic dividend**, a temporary economic benefit created by a significant increase in the ratio of working-age adults relative to young


dependents.<sup>11, 12, 13</sup> If fertility and childhood mortality fall rapidly, previously high fertility creates a cohort of survivors which is larger than subsequent cohorts, resulting in a temporary demographic phenomenon referred to as a "youth bulge" that was experienced in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia in the 1980s.<sup>14</sup> As this youth bulge moves into the economically productive ages (theoretically, 15-64 years), countries can benefit since in theory, with fewer dependents, resources that would have paid for education, health, and basic services for large numbers of children can be re-invested for longer-term economic growth and capital development.<sup>15</sup> The key point is that a "youth bulge" requires that both births and child mortality decline rapidly. To reap from a youth bulge is however not automatic. Countries must invest in human capital, provide an enabling economic environment, and create adequate numbers of decent jobs for the youth and working age adults. They should also ensure equitable access to available jobs. Notable examples where countries have failed to maximise the demographic dividend include Tunisia in North Africa and South Africa.<sup>15</sup>

Currently, the population age-structures of the four EAC countries are typical of most African countries, with a large base of young people. Such an age-structure, not to be confused with a youth bulge, has an unfavourable ratio of working-age population to dependents and countries are unlikely to benefit economically unless there are significant investments made in programmes to reduce fertility. However, with the current fertility levels in the four countries, population projections show that only Kenya

and Rwanda are likely to see the start of a youth bulge under the low UN variant which assumes that fertility will drop to about two children in both countries by 2050. If, however the rate of fertility decline is what we have seen in the past, only Rwanda may likely achieve the start of the youth bulge by 2065.

Demographers use the inverse of the dependency ratio as a proxy for the support ratio (ratio of effective producers to consumers), in effect assuming that everyone between 15-64 years (or 20-64 years) is contributing to household income and the rest are consumers rather than producers. The rate of change of the support ratio has been used to show the timing when the window of opportunity for harnessing the demographic dividend opens and closes. While the rate of change of the theoretical support ratio is positive, the window of opportunity to reap the demographic dividend is open. However, once the rate of change of the support turns negative, the dividend becomes negative, implying that the demographic change acts as a brake on economic growth rather than an impetus for economic growth.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 3 shows that the window of opportunity for the countries in the EAC and sub-Saharan Africa is open from now until 2100, when the ratio of effective producers relative to consumers will become unfavourable. It should be emphasised that this window of opportunity can close without a country reaping a sizeable demographic dividend if the youth do not have the skills for the labour market or the country is unable to create enough jobs for the growing population of workers.



<sup>11</sup> Lee R., and A. Mason, principal authors and editors. 2011. Population Aging and the Generational Economy: A Global Perspective. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing

<sup>12</sup> Bloom, D. E., & Williamson, J. G. (1998). Demographic transitions and economic miracles in emerging Asia. The World Bank Economic Review, 12(3), 419-455.

<sup>13</sup> Bloom DE, Humair S, Rosenberg L, Sevilla JP, & Trussell J. (2014). Capturing the demographic dividend: Source, magnitude and realization. 2014. Pp 23-39 in A Soucat and M Ncube (Eds), One Billion People One

Billion Opportunities: Building Human Capital in Africa. Tunis: African Development Bank.

<sup>14</sup> Justin Yifu Lin. (2012). Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in Developing Countries? <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend-or-a-demographic-bomb-in-developing-countries>

<sup>15</sup> Oosthuizen M.J. (2015). Bonus or mirage? South Africa's demographic dividend. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Volume 5, April 2015, Pages 14-22

## Review of policy responses to youth demographics

The governments of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (as indeed is the case in the EAC and Africa in general) have recognised youth as a key sub-group with needs that require to be addressed for these countries to achieve sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development. To this end, these countries have all developed national youth policies aimed at addressing the needs of youths but there are significant policy and implementation gaps. All four countries have youth policies: Uganda (2016); Tanzania (2007); Kenya (2006) and Rwanda (2015). All the youth policies highlight the shared challenges among young people such as inadequate access to health care, poor quality of education, drug and substance abuse, unemployment and exposure to violence. Specifically, the challenges of youth unemployment and insufficient training are uppermost in these policies, and while other issues such as HIV/AIDS, adolescent childbearing and lack of political participation are mentioned in the policies, there is insufficient cross-referencing to relevant policies that can address these issues. At a regional level, the EAC Youth Policy seeks to guide member states in mainstreaming youth issues into policies, laws and programmes, and to harmonise strategies and implementation of policies.<sup>16</sup> The EAC Youth Policy is a guide that does not supersede the individual countries' youth policies. At the country level, there are gaps between policy statements and implementation. For example, a criticism of Kenya's National Youth Policy (KNYP) implementation is that although a National Youth Council was set up in 2009, there is confusion over which agency/department has overall responsibility for certain functions (e.g. monitoring and evaluation of

the KNYP). Also, there is a lack of alignment between KNYP and its parent Ministry's strategic priorities especially in the areas of sports, media, ICT, crime, and community service.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, issues of adolescent sexual and reproductive health and rights (ASRHR), and youth-friendly services are highly visible in policies on family planning or ASRH. However, the high levels of unmet need among sexually active adolescents and youth in the region, coupled with high levels of childbearing at young ages demonstrate that these policies have not been effectively implemented.

## Future Implications of Youth Demographics for EAC countries

Fertility is the most influential determinant of population change in selected countries of the East Africa region. A reduction in total fertility levels and delayed childbearing beyond adolescence has long-term impact in reducing the population growth rate of the youth segment as well as total population in the region. The large youthful population today will sustain the population momentum within the region, implying that the population will continue to grow for several decades even if the countries were to achieve replacement fertility of 2.1 in the next 30-50 years. Using UN models to generate population projections for 2030, 2050, and 2065, we assessed the future demand for schools, family planning services and jobs. The UN Medium variant scenario assumes that increases in contraceptive use will result in lower fertility in patterns similar to the experience of other countries that have gone through the demographic transition. The UN Low variant scenario, assumes that for most of the projection period, fertility is half a birth lower than the medium variant. The UN model makes allowance for high mortality due to HIV/AIDS in high prevalence countries and migration in

countries where there is significant movement of people [see UN methodology for fuller discussion].<sup>18</sup> We also analysed an Accelerated model, where we assumed that total fertility would decline rapidly to replacement level by 2065. The Accelerated scenario and Low variant model are almost identical in terms of the projected populations.

Population projections using the UN Medium variant in the four countries show that the size of youth population (15-34 years) would increase markedly by 2065, ranging from 7.7 million in Rwanda to 62.3 million in Tanzania (Table 2). Under the Accelerated model, Rwanda will have the smallest youth population at 7.2 million, while Tanzania would have the largest at 47.7 million. The percentage of the population who are youth (15-24 years or 15-34 years) will reduce between 2015 and 2065 in Kenya and Rwanda and almost remain unchanged in Tanzania and Uganda where fertility is still very high (see Figure 4).

The high fertility rate prevailing in the four EAC countries will have a serious implication on school age population at both primary and secondary school and the costs for the provision of education, as the population numbers will increase for decades to come. In Tanzania and Uganda, primary and secondary school age population will more than double between 2015 and 2065 both under the medium and accelerated/low variant scenarios. On the other hand, school age population in Kenya and Rwanda will increase until 2050 after which there will be a decline in the demand for primary and secondary school places because of smaller cohorts in school going age groups. This is because the fertility in both countries will have declined markedly by 2050 compared to Uganda and Tanzania.

Table 2: Projected youth population age 15-34 years in the EAC region (in thousands)


Country	Baseline Population (2015)	UN Medium Variant Scenario (2065)	Accelerated Model (2065)
Kenya	17,090	35,369	29,867
Rwanda	4,188	7,691	7,182
Tanzania	17,881	62,270	47,737
Uganda	22,668	48,111	42,408
TOTAL	61,827	153,441	127,194

<sup>16</sup> East African Community Youth Policy (2013) <http://meac.go.ke/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/EAC-Youth-Policy.pdf> Accessed on 23rd/ August/2017

<sup>17</sup> UNICEF and IEA-Kenya (no date). Youth: Situation and Investment in Kenya.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Methodology of the United Nations Population Estimates and Projections, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.242.

Figure 4: Projected percentage of youth population in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, 2015-20 and 2065 (UN Medium variant projections)



The results also show that the demand for contraception among female youth will increase steadily at all age groups. For example, among the oldest female youth group, 30-34 years, the demand for contraception will grow 5-fold in Uganda, 4-fold in Tanzania, 3-fold in Kenya and, 2-fold Rwanda (Figure 5). Although the increase in demand of contraceptives requires significant increase in investments, in the long run there will be huge savings accrued from reduced costs for healthcare because of unintended pregnancies, unsafe abortion, HIV in pregnancy care, and unplanned births.

The share of young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEET) provides a broad measure of the untapped potential of young people who could contribute to national development through work. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) argues that young people in this group deserve attention since they are neither improving their future employability through investments in skills

nor gaining experience through employment. If the levels of employment, school enrolment, and training remain the same, the projected number of youth who are NEETS in the four East African countries will increase from 9.8 million to nearly 22 million by 2050 (see Table 3). Apart from these socially excluded young people being at an increased risk of falling into the poverty trap, they are also a potential destabilising force that can cause civil disturbance or be a potential recruiting pool for radical forces (including rebel groups and terrorists). They also form a pool of desperate potential labour migrants.

#### Modelling the demographic dividend

The potential demographic dividend the four EAC countries could earn between 2010 and 2050 has been estimated using the DemDiv modelling tool<sup>19, 20, 21, 22, 23</sup> under four policy scenarios: (i) Business as Usual, where slow progress in economic reforms, human capital development and decline in fertility rate persist

till 2050; (ii) Economic emphasis, where the focus of investments is on improving economic competitiveness and productive efficiency without simultaneous focus on investing in education and family planning; (iii) Economic and Education emphasis, where investments are made to enhance both economic competitiveness and education levels but not on family planning; and iv) Combined emphasis, where optimal investments are made in family planning in addition to economic competitiveness and education. The benchmark countries include Malaysia, South Korea, South Africa and Mauritius, countries that have attained economic development that EAC countries aspire to emulate or surpass by 2050.

The results for the Combined scenario show that the demographic indicators and emerging economic opportunities in the four countries can be turned into a huge impetus for the socio-economic transformation envisaged in the long-term development visions. The countries will

<sup>19</sup>Moreland, S., E. L. Madsen, B. Kuang, M. Hamilton, K. Jurczynska, & P. Brodish. (2014). Modeling the Demographic Dividend: Technical Guide to the DemDiv Model. Washington, DC.  
<sup>20</sup>National Council for Population and Development and Health policy Project. (2014) Demographic dividend opportunities for Kenya: results from the DemDiv model. Nairobi, Kenya.  
<sup>21</sup>National Planning Authority (NPA), AFIDEP (2014): Harnessing the Demographic Dividend, accelerating socioeconomic transformation in Uganda, July 2014

<sup>22</sup>National Institute for Statistics in Rwanda, UNFPA, AFIDEP. Unlocking Rwanda's potential to reap the demographic dividend Kigali, Rwanda: 2017.  
<sup>23</sup>Pathfinder-Tanzania, UDSM, AFIDEP. 2017. Prospects and challenges of harnessing demographic dividend in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Figure 5: Number of youth, 15-34 years in need of contraception, 2015-2065 (in thousands)




Table 3: Projected numbers of youth Not in Education, Employment or Training [NEET] (in thousands)

Kenya	2015	2030		2050		2065	
	Baseline ((UN Medium Variant)	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant	Accelerated	UN Medium Variant
15-19	1,203	1,595	1,596	1,812	2,000	1,639	2,144
20-24	1,360	2,035	2,033	2,421	2,550	2,335	2,816
25-29	1,311	1,856	1,851	2,419	2,462	2,482	2,827
30-34	824	1,166	1,161	1,664	1,662	1,799	1,969
15-34	4,939	6,958	6,946	8,702	9,091	8,632	10,222
<b>Tanzania</b>							
15-19	938	1,516	1,521	1,945	2,313	1,975	2,898
20-24	795	1,304	1,302	1,856	2,076	2,026	2,699
25-29	670	1,096	1,091	1,732	1,845	2,005	2,484
30-34	565	890	889	1,597	1,637	1,918	2,256
35	93	149	150	292	290	365	404
15-35	3,062	4,955	4,953	7,422	8,161	8,289	10,741
<b>Rwanda</b>							
16-24	123	181	182	206	209	199	219
25-34	187	235	235	329	322	346	360
16-34	310	416	417	535	532	545	579
<b>Uganda</b>							
15-19	606	970	964	1,377	1,482	1,461	1,796
20-24	499	835	831	1,293	1,345	1,474	1,688
25-29	403	700	698	1,180	1,198	1,436	1,570
15-29	1,508	2,506	2,493	3,850	4,024	4,371	5,053

achieve favourable age-structures that lead to higher ratios of working-age to dependent populations. As Table 4 shows, under the Combined scenario, all the four countries could graduate to Upper-middle income level by 2050/2055, with Rwanda reaching high income level by 2055. The demographic dividends (expressed as the difference between income earned under the Combined and Economic Emphasis scenarios)

earned would range from US\$ 3,457 in Rwanda to US\$ 4,595 in Kenya. All these estimates remain hypothetical unless the countries prioritise investments that simultaneously create globally competitive economies and accelerate economic growth and creation of jobs. Fertility would need to significantly decline through voluntary and rights-based interventions in education and family planning.

Table 4: Projected Per Capita GDP by Different DD Policy Scenarios (US\$)

Country	Current PC GDP	Business as Usual	Economic Emphasis	Combined Scenario	Potential DD Earned
Kenya	907	896	6,693	11,288	4,595
Tanzania	967	2,063	7,779	11,657	3,878
Uganda	506	927	6,084	9,567	3,483
Rwanda	735	2,764	9,098	12,555	3,457

## What is the risk of “business as usual”?

The projected rapid growth of the youth population in the four EAC countries will place significant pressure on the region’s economy given the need to educate, house, and provide healthcare for the youth. As the population grows in rural areas and land for growing food becomes scarce, there is likely to be increased migration from rural to urban areas in search of livelihoods. International migration is also likely to increase as young people seek livelihood opportunities in neighbouring countries and beyond. Estimates from the United Nations migration statistics suggest that roughly 2.5 million inhabitants from Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda emigrated in 2015 alone and about 35% were youth between 15-34 years. Men and women were equally likely to migrate. Finally, inactivity in addressing youth demographics may threaten the region’s security since unemployed, disenchanted youth can react by causing civil unrest.<sup>24, 25</sup>

## Recommendations to DFID and Development partners

The development partners and the private sector should work with governments to ensure that youth policies are revised to reflect the current situation of young people and implemented to translate the countries’ youthful population into a valuable development resource. Most of the countries in the region have developed DD frameworks or roadmaps that are yet to be implemented. The role of the development partners is to help the governments translate these frameworks into specific actions with clear targets. This can be done by, for example, increasing the capacity of local experts to prioritise and cost interventions, supporting countries with funds for clearly defined interventions that will maximise the prospects of benefitting from the youthful population, and enhanced accountability and monitoring measures of progress of such interventions.

## Recommendations to EAC and National Governments

The African Union’s roadmap for harnessing the demographic dividend has identified four pillars. These are: employment and entrepreneurship; education and skills development; health and wellbeing; and rights, governance, and youth empowerment. The recommendations below align with the AU pillars. Given the benefits of women and girls empowerment and the urgent need to sustainably manage the environment, we have added recommendations under these two to emphasise their role in harnessing the potential of the demographics in the region.

## Acknowledgements

*This briefing note has been prepared by the African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP) in partnership with the University of Southampton and national experts.*

Priority area	Description of investment
 <p>Family planning and Health.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Child survival programmes such as immunisation and the eradication of Malaria to improve human capital and to accelerate fertility decline.</li> <li>ii. Universal access to contraception to address the high unmet need especially among those living in rural areas, urban slums, and among youth.</li> <li>iii. Prevention of new HIV infections among youth and treatment of those who are infected to improve human capital.</li> <li>iv. Good nutrition and promoting active life-styles to prevent overweight/obesity epidemic among youth.</li> </ul>
 <p>Education and skills development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Invest in school-construction projects to match the growth in population.</li> <li>ii. Put in place measures to evaluate and improve learning outcomes aimed at attaining quality education and training.</li> <li>iii. Increase female participation in secondary and tertiary education.</li> <li>iv. Involve employers in curriculum reforms for tertiary and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions to ensure that appropriate transferable skills form part of the training.</li> </ul>
 <p>Economic reforms that promote job creation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Create an enabling environment for the creation of jobs, youth entrepreneurship, and encourage savings for pensions. Promote innovation hubs and facilitate the financial inclusion as critical options to stem unemployment in the EAC.</li> <li>ii. Decent livelihood opportunities to discourage the brain drain of young people moving to other countries in search of jobs</li> <li>iii. Develop agribusiness and encourage greater youth participation in the sector.</li> <li>iv. Eliminate any form of discrimination in access to available jobs, particularly in the formal sector, to promote equity.</li> </ul>
 <p>Women’s and girls’ empowerment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Empower girls to participate in secondary and tertiary education and in science, technology, and mathematics.</li> <li>ii. Outlaw practices that affect women’s empowerment such as child marriages and gender-based violence and ensure these are enforced.</li> </ul>
 <p>Environment and climate</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Work with youth to raise awareness of environmental issues and good stewardship of natural resources.</li> <li>ii. Urban planning should take into consideration both natural growth and rural-to-urban migration. Rural development schemes that offer attractive livelihood opportunities for youth can help to manage rapid urbanisation.</li> </ul>
 <p>Governance and accountability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Improve governance and accountability to improve security and shared prosperity.</li> <li>ii. Include youth in decision-making spaces especially on matters that affect them.</li> </ul>

<sup>24</sup> Cramer, C. World Development Report (2011). Unemployment and Participation in Violence. London

<sup>25</sup> Azeng, Therese F. and Yogo, Thierry U. (2013). Youth Unemployment And Political Instability In Selected Developing Countries. Working Paper Series N° 171 African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia.